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“Come senators, congressmen
Please heed the call
Don’t stand in the doorway
Don’t block up the hall
For he that gets hurt
Will be he who has stalled
There’s a battle outside and it is ragin’
It’ll soon shake your windows and rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin’”1
“We are in a new era in which diagnosis has such social and political
implications that one is constantly on the front lines fighting on issues
our forebears were spared.”2
INTRODUCTION
Historically, courts and legislatures have been reluctant to establish legal protections for transgender and transsexual people in the
United States.3 This may be due, in part, to the slow pace at which
American society itself has come to accept this very misunderstood
psychological and biological phenomenon. Fortunately, as scientific
research and social acceptance mature, this minority is beginning to
enjoy greater rights and recognition.
In recent years, the transgender community has enjoyed significant changes in law and society. In February 2010, the U.S. Tax
Court in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner ruled that sex-transitioning
treatments were tax deductible.4 The following November, the first
openly transsexual judge in the nation was elected to the California

1

(1964).

2

BOB DYLAN, THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 2005)

Jack Drescher, Queer Diagnoses: Parallels and Contrasts in the History of
Homosexuality, Gender Variance, and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 39
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 427, 428 (2010) (quoting RONALD BAYER,
HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 10
(1981)).
3
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th
Cong. (2009).
4
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 77 (2010).
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bench.5 Anti-discrimination legislation protecting jobs and housing is
becoming increasingly popular, and the Affordable Care Act removed
some barriers to better health care.6
These changes demonstrate greater legal recognition and social
acceptance of transgender people in the United States. More importantly, these are changes that promote the interests of all transsexual
citizens, not just the few who cry out and demand justice for themselves.7 While a U.S. Tax Court ruling may not influence how all
state and federal courts will interpret the rights of transgender people
in other contexts, it may convince some that social expectations are
changing and that action is required to guarantee constitutionallyentitled protections.
The Eighth Amendment’s history perhaps best reflects how courts
have expanded constitutional protections in light of evolving social
standards of decency. The Eighth Amendment’s simple language8
belies the array of protections it grants prison inmates and the duties it
imposes on prison officials, including the foremost duty—to provide
for inmates’ basic needs.9 Adequate, if minimal, health care is well
recognized as a basic need.10
Transgender inmates face greater struggles than much of the nonincarcerated transgender community. Some advocates for transsexual
inmates’ rights argue that prisons should provide the full treatment
series—psychotherapy, hormone therapy, and sex reassignment surgery—prescribed by the World Professional Association of Transgender Health’s (WPATH) Standards of Care.11 WPATH is an inter5

Woman Becomes Nation’s 1st Transgender Trial Judge, CNSNEWS.COM
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/woman-becomes-nations-1sttransgender-tr.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Maggert v. Hanks,
131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997); De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003);
Praylor v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir. 2005). In these
cases, the plaintiff inmates sued only for his or her individual healthcare—not for the
healthcare of all transsexual inmates as a class. Of course, transsexual inmates may
bring such class actions for better treatment. See Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp.
1252 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
8
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9
Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]hose deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ are sufficiently
grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”) (quoting Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
10
Sharon Dolovitch, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment,
84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 881, 881-82 (2009).
11
See Travis Cox, Medically Necessary Treatments for Transgender Prisoners and the Misguided Law in Wisconsin, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 341, 342
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national organization that promotes greater understanding and appropriate care for those suffering from gender identity disorder (GID).12
The Standards of Care represent the international medical community’s consensus on the required care for transgender people.13 These
advocates contend that given the unique needs of transsexuals, denying the full treatment series violates the Eighth Amendment. However, my own analysis demonstrates that any treatments beyond psychotherapy and hormones exceed the constitutionally-mandated degree of care.14
In this Note, I argue that (1) the standard for adequate medical
care requires only sex-appropriate hormone therapies for those transsexual inmates that need them, (2) sexual reassignment surgery is, in
most cases, beyond the threshold of minimal adequate care and thus
not required by the Eighth Amendment, and (3) prisons must provide
housing that ensures the safety of transsexual inmates and the proper
administration of adequate health care.
Part I will discuss general background information concerning
what transsexualism is, the treatments prescribed by the medical
community, and the significant problems transsexuals face in the
United States. Part II will introduce the tax court case O’Donnabhain
v. Commissioner and other indicia of the improving social, legal, and
political situation for transsexuals. Part III will discuss Eighth
Amendment protections for inmate health care, and case law demonstrating problems with current prison policies regarding care for transsexual inmates. Part IV will propose changes to prison policies so as
to balance the respective constitutional rights and duties of inmates
and officials.
I.

TRANSSEXUALISM DEFINED

For most people, there is no disparity between how their body develops sexually and how they self-identify their gender. It is therefore
difficult for many to understand the legal and social difficulties that
transgender and transsexual people must endure in the United States.
That our society’s standards of decency have only recently progressed
(2009); Harper Jean Tobin, Note, Against the Surgical Requirement for Change of
Legal Sex, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 393, 396 (2007).
12
See World Professional Association for Transgender Health: Mission
Statement, WORLD PROF. ASS’N OF TRANSGENDER HEALTH (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://www.wpath.org/about_mission.cfm.
13
See HARRY BENJAMIN INT’L GEND. DYSPHORIA ASS’N, STANDARDS OF
CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 1 (6th ed. 2001), available at
http://www.wpath.org/documents2/socv6.pdf [hereinafter STANDARDS OF CARE].
14
See infra Part IV.
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to the point of accepting transgender and transsexual people is best
revealed by examination of the legal and social prejudices that systematically deny their participatory rights. This begins with understanding what exactly it is about transsexualism, medically and socially, that makes individuals with this condition easy prey for social
prejudice.
A.

Understanding the Relationship between Gender
and Sex

To understand transgender people, the distinction between sex and
gender must also be understood. Transgenderism exists because sex
and gender are not necessarily identical.15 Sex is an objective physical attribute determined by an individual’s primary sex organs, the
genitalia.16 No one has direct influence over how their own or another’s sex develops in the womb. Post-natal sex, however, may be
decided (perhaps arbitrarily) when the child’s genitalia is ambiguous
or disfigured by a careless circumcision.17
Gender is completely subjective, and better understood as sense of
self.18 Gender identity may be suppressed, but it cannot be changed.
There is an increasing amount of scientific evidence that gender-sex
incongruity is related to how the brain structure that governs gender
develops in response to sex hormones in the womb.19 This does not
mean that transgender people have brain deformities.20 Instead, the
gender-sex incongruity only means that the brain developed under
different hormonal influences than the rest of the body.
It is also important to distinguish the terms “transgender” and
“transsexual.” Transgender people are those individuals whose subjective gender does not align with their objective sex.21 “Transgender” is an umbrella category that includes transsexuals as a unique
15

George R. Brown & Everett McDuffie, Health Care Policies Addressing
Transgender Inmates in Prison Systems in the United States, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL
HEALTH CARE 280, 280 (2009).
16
Id.
17
Sometimes performing surgeries on “intersex infants,” or those infants
with sexually ambiguous genitalia, is not even medically necessary but merely a
procedure for the “purposes of ‘confirming’ an earlier assignment to either male or
female genders.” Drescher, supra note 2, at 431.
18
Brown, supra note 15, at 280.
19
Linda D. Chin, Note/Comment, A Prisoner’s Right to Transsexual Therapies: A Look at Brooks v. Berg, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 151, 159 (2004); Dick F.
Swaab, Sexual Differentiation of the Brain and Behavior, 21 BEST PRAC. & RES.
CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 431, 436-37 (2007).
20
Chin, supra note 19, at 159.
21
Brown, supra note 15, at 280.
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subset.22 Transsexuals are transgender individuals who feel that their
physical sex is so divergent from their mental gender that they want to
make the physical alterations to align their sex with their gender, or to
make their body feel right for their mind.23
Unfortunately, social understanding often lags behind scientific
discovery.24 All too often, transsexualism is misconstrued as just another facet of homosexuality, or degraded as a sexual perversion or a
mere psychological delusion.25 But transsexualism does not bear relation to sexual proclivity, sexual orientation, or mental illness.26
Rather, it is entirely concerned with self-identification of gender identity.27 No gender identity precludes anyone from being “heterosexual/straight, homosexual/gay/lesbian or identify as queer.”28
It is easier for society to dismiss and marginalize transgender
people as exceptionally rare “freaks” when people are unaware of how
many transgender people there are in the population. Transgenderism
is far from rare; one survey estimates that only 2–5 percent (one in
fifty to one in twenty) of Americans are transgender.29 Transsexualism, however, is quite rare, with birth rates of only about 0.00833
percent (one in 12,000) male-to-female and 0.00333 percent (one in
30,000) female-to-male individuals.30 When contrasted with an esti-

22
Beth Rankin, Transsexual v. Transgender: Explaining the Intricacies,
FUSION
MAGAZINE
(2004),
http://fusion.kent.edu/archives/spring04/trans/transprint.html.
23
Swaab, supra note 19, at 435. Despite this distinction, as one commentator phrased it: “[b]oth terms describe a section of the sexual minority seeking only to
feel comfortable in their own skin.” Rankin, supra note 22.
24
Ally Windsor Howell, A Comparison of the Treatment of Transgender
Persons in the Criminal Justice Systems of Ontario, Canada, New York, and California, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 133, 143 (2010).
25
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 78 (2010). In Cuoco v. Moritsugu, the prison officials argued that Cuoco was not a transsexual, just a “homosexual
who took estrogen for aesthetic purposes.” 222 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2000).
26
See Howell, supra note 24, at 136-37.
27
Tobin, supra note 11, at 397.
28
Teaching Transgender, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 25 (Jan.
2009), http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE_Teaching_Transgender.pdf [hereinafter NCTE].
29
Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet, TRANSGENDER L. & POL’Y INST. 1
(2008), http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf; the transgenderism statistic estimates the number of individuals who “experience some degree of
gender dysphoria.” Id.; one population estimate for the United States gives a range
between 7,000 and 200,000 transgender people. Tobin, supra note 11, at 397.
30
Marek Mędraś & Paweł Jóźków, Transsexualism—Diagnostic and Therapeutic Aspects, 61 POLISH J. ENDOCRINOLOGY 412, 412 (2010). A more recent study
estimated a much higher prevalence of transsexualism in the population: 1 in 3,639
male-to-females and 1 in 22,714 female-to-males. Id. at 413. The NCTE reports
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mated 4–5 percent (one in twenty-five to one in twenty) of males and
2–3 percent (one in fifty to one in thirty-three) of females being born
homosexual,31 it is easier to comprehend how miniscule, and easily
ignored, a sexual and social minority transsexuals are. The real hurdle
that transsexuals face is the social, and perhaps cultural,32 predisposition towards viewing sex and gender as a naturally aligned binary
phenomenon.33 Our society prefers the conception that an individual
at birth will, by biological necessity, be only a male or female in mind
and body for life.34 For many raised according to this view, it is difficult to comprehend that sex and gender do not go hand-in-hand and
that, in neither case, does one cause the other.
Neither transgenderism nor transsexualism is a mental illness.
However, transsexuals as a class suffer from a condition called “Gender Identity Disorder” (GID) or “Gender Dysphoria,” which arises
from the severity of their gender-sex incongruity.35 The Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV) currently
lists GID as a psychological disorder.36 GID is described as:
transsexualism rates are between a 0.25-1 percent of the population. NCTE, supra
note 28, at 19.
31
Richard Green, Transsexual Legal Rights in the United States and United
Kingdom: Employment, Medical Treatment, and Civil Status, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 153, 153 (2010).
32
NCTE, supra note 28, at 19.
33
Howell, supra note 24, at 133. In many, if not all facets of society and
administration in the United States, the conventional binary gender system is used.
34
See Drescher, supra note 2, at 431 (“To maintain this gender binary, most
cultures traditionally insisted that every individual be assigned to the category of
either man or woman at birth and that individuals conform to the category to which
they have been assigned thereafter.”).
35
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 581 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
36
Id. at 580; It is an interesting point that the DSM used to list homosexuality as a psychological disorder for some time as well. The DSM-I published in 1952
classified homosexuality as a “sociopathic personality disturbance” and the DSM-II
published in 1968 reclassified homosexuality as a “sexual deviation” and as “sexual
orientation disturbance.” To accompany the removal of homosexuality as an illness
per se from the DSM-III in 1973, the American Psychiatric Association issued this
statement:
Whereas homosexuality in and of itself implies no impairment in judgment, stability,
reliability, or vocational capabilities, therefore, be it resolved that the American Psychiatric Association deplores all public and private discrimination against homosexuals in such areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, and licensing, and
declares that no burden of proof of such judgment, capacity, or reliability shall be
placed on homosexuals greater than that imposed on any other persons. Further, the
APA supports and urges the enactment of civil rights legislation at local, state, and
federal levels that would insure homosexual citizens the same protections now guaranteed to others. Further, the APA supports and urges the repeal of all legislation
making criminal offenses of sexual acts performed by consenting adults in private.
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(1) [a] strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for any perceived cultural
advantages of being the other sex);
(2) [a] persistent discomfort with his or her sex or
sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of
that sex;
(3) [a] disturbance [that] is not concurrent with a
physical intersex condition; and
(4) [a] disturbance [that] causes clinically significant
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning.37
Gender dysphoria has been more simply described as the “discomfort felt when one’s physical gender assigned at birth is incongruous with one’s gender identity.”38 Although the categorization as a
mental disorder implies that the disturbance comes from within, external pressure to conform to cultural sexual norms contributes to the
identity discomfort.39 Naturally, for many reasons, controversy regarding inclusion of GID in the DSM-IV abounds.40 Despite the inherent negative connotations of a “mental” or “psychological” disorder, many transsexuals recognize that their best path to receiving
benefits under current medical policies is grounded in having a clinically-categorized condition.41

Drescher, supra note 2, at 434-35.
37
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 35, at 581.
38
Cox, supra note 11, at 343.
39
Judith S. Stern & Claire V. Merkine, Brian L. v. Administration for Children’s Services: Ambivalence Toward Gender Identity Disorder as a Medical Condition, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 566, 569 (2009).
40
Arguments to remove GID include “societal intolerance of difference, the
human cost of diagnostic stigmatization, using the language of psychopathology to
describe what some consider to be normal behaviors and feelings, and . . . inappropriately focusing psychiatric attention on individual diversity rather than opposing the
social forces that oppress sexual and gender nonconformity.” Drescher, supra note 2,
at 429.
41
Id. at 441; see also Alvin Lee, Trans Models in Prison: The Medicalization of Gender Identity and the Eighth Amendment Right to Sex Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447, 453, 455-56 (2008).
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Effective Therapies for Treating Gender
Identity Disorder

For transsexuals wanting to pursue sex transformation, WPATH
drafted the Standards of Care.42 The Standards of Care represent the
international medical community’s consensus on treatment of GIDs.43
These guidelines detail a clinical sequence of escalating treatments
that facilitate a controlled transition ensuring that patients receive only
those treatments that are medically warranted.44 The sequence first
calls for psychiatric therapy,45 followed by hormonal sex reassignment
with psychiatrist approval.46 Then, the patient must complete a reallife experience of no less than one year during which he or she lives
fully in his or her community as the intended sex.47 Finally, after a
successful real-life experience, and with approval of two psychiatrists,
the patient may undergo surgical sex reassignment.48
Given that the suffering arises from the incongruity, the only effective remedy is to bring subjective gender and objective sex into
harmony. The ultimate goal of the clinical process is not just physical
transformation, but also to improve the patient’s psychological wellbeing and chances for “self-fulfillment” in society.49 Without these
therapies, transsexuals are at risk of serious psychological problems
beyond GID, such as depression, anxiety,50 self-mutilation, and suicidal tendencies.51
Unfortunately, for many transsexuals, seeking this care is prohibitively expensive.52 The estimated cost for female-to-male surgery is
42

O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 37 (2010).
See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 1.
44
Id. at 1-2 (describing the Standard’s gatekeeping function as a “clinical
threshold [that] is passed when concerns, uncertainties, and questions about gender
identity persist during a person’s development, become so intense as to seem to be the
most important aspect of a person’s life, or prevent the establishment of a relatively
unconflicted gender identity”).
45
See id. at 3, 11-13.
46
See id. at 3, 8, 13-14.
47
See id. at 3, 17-18.
48
See id. at 3, 8, 18-22.
49
Chin, supra note 19, at 160 (quoting STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13,
at 1).
50
Lee, supra note 41, at 450.
51
Amy Zimmerman Hodges, Identifying the Linguistic Boundaries of Sex:
Court Language Choice in Decisions Regarding the Availability of Sex and Procreation, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 413, 437 (2005).
52
Sydney Tarzwell, The Gender Lines Are Marked with Razor Wire: Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender
Prisoners, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167, 174 (2006).
43
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approximately $50,000.53 Male-to-female surgeries can cost as much
as $100,000.54 Comparatively, hormone treatment is inexpensive.
Hormones can cost between $300 and $2,400 per year, depending on
the brand and dosage prescribed.55 In a single year, the Department of
Corrections (DoC) spent only $4,400 on hormones for two inmates.56
These procedures and treatments are rarely covered by health insurance or government-funded health-care assistance, and most transgender people do not even have insurance for regular health-care
needs.57 Only recently has the Internal Revenue Service granted
medical expense tax deductions to help defray the costs.58 Although
the cost of treatment is high, it is not the highest hurdle transsexuals
must overcome. Due to discrimination in the workplace and housing
market, many transsexuals cannot adequately provide for themselves
or pay for the procedures59 that will improve their quality of life.
C.

Social and Economic Problems Transsexuals
Endure

As suggested earlier, GID may be the result of external social
forces. Unlike racial and ethnic minorities, homosexuals, and the
physically and mentally disabled,60 neither transgender people nor
transsexuals are explicitly protected by federal antidiscrimination
laws. While transsexuals have a legally recognized psychiatric condition that would otherwise be covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Act specifically excludes transsexuals, as well as transvestism and GID.61
53
Bradley A. Sultan, Transsexual Prisoners: How Much Treatment is
Enough?, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (2003).
54
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
55
Sex
Reassignment
Surgery
Cost,
COSTHELPER,
http://www.costhelper.com/cost/health/sex-reassignment-surgery.html (last updated
Aug. 2009).
56
Cox, supra note 11, at 361.
57
Transgender
Issues:
A
Fact
Sheet,
TRANSGENDER
LAW,
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,
2011).
58
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 77 (2010).
59
Preliminary Findings: National Transgender Discrimination Survey,
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE 1
(Nov.
2009),
http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE_prelim_survey_econ.pdf
[hereinafter NTDS].
60
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241;
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006), amended by the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 12101 (2008).
61
Green, supra note 31, at 158.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has also historically not
granted transgender and transsexual plaintiffs explicit protection.
Beginning in the 1970s, when plaintiffs alleged that they were fired
due to their transsexual status, the circuit courts rejected arguments
that the term ‘sex’ as protected under Title VII incorporates ‘gender,’
which encompasses transsexuals,62 and held that the statute only
maintains the “traditional notions of ‘sex.’”63 The Ninth Circuit supported this plain reading conclusion by denying that a narrow interpretation of Title VII raised equal protection issues, asserting that transsexuals are neither a suspect class nor a “discrete and insular minority” as categorized by an “immutable characteristic determined solely
by the accident of birth.”64 The Seventh Circuit went so far as to say
that, “even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created from
what remains of a man,” discrimination must be based on being a
woman and not a transsexual for Title VII to apply.65 This rule foreclosed any hope for relief in the workplace for many years.
Discrimination against transgender and transsexual people is
based on either direct knowledge of gender identity status or nonconforming expressions of gender identity.66 A 2009 survey of several
thousand transgender and transsexual people in the United States reported that 13 percent of transgender people were unemployed, 26
percent had been fired due to their transgender status, and 97 percent
reported being harassed at work.67 The poverty rates are even more
shocking. Twenty-seven percent earn less than $20,000 and 15 percent earning less than $10,000; in the general population, only 7 per-

62

1977).

Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir.

63
Id. The court even noted that the prohibition on sex discrimination was
itself barely included and was added last minute “without prior hearing or debate.”
Id. at 662.
64
Id. at 663 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)); see
also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667, F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (agreeing
with the Ninth Circuit that “the word ‘sex’ in Title VII is to be given its traditional
definition, rather than an expansive interpretation,” which does not protect gender
identity or a plaintiff not properly classified as either male or female); Ulane v. E.
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he words of Title VII
do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual identity disorder . . .
.”).
65
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087.
66
JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE
AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION
SURVEY:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
3
(2011),
available
at
http://transequality.org/PDFs/NTDS_Exec_Summary.pdf.
67
NTDS, supra note 59, at 1-2.
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cent reported less than $10,000.68 It is clearly evident that transsexual
individuals disproportionately suffer from economic inequalities.
When it comes to housing discrimination, there are no protections,69 and given their higher rates of poverty, many transgender people end up living on the streets. In the 2009 survey, 11 percent of
transgender people had been evicted due to their transgender status,
and 19 percent had been, or were currently, homeless.70
Without a stable place to live or work in the “legitimate” economy,71 many transsexuals must choose between poverty or criminal
activity in the sex and drug trades to pay for black market health care
or just to survive day-to-day.72 As a result, transsexuals have become
an overrepresented minority in prisons where they face even greater
neglect and victimization.73 The total U.S. combined state and federal
prison population is just over two million inmates.74 As of January
2011, there were roughly 210,000 inmates in federal prisons.75 A
2007 survey estimated that 50 to 100 transsexual inmates were held in
federal facilities.76 Comparing even the more common male-tofemale transsexual birth rate of one in 12,000 to the estimated rate in
federal prison of one in 2,100,77 it becomes evident that transsexual
incarceration rates are disproportionate to those of the general population. There must be some sociological or economic reasons behind
this, because it is clear that being born with a gender-sex incongruity
does not make one naturally more inclined to commit crime. Fortu68

Id. at 2.
See Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 167-68.
70
NTDS, supra note 59, at 3.
71
Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 167-68.
72
Cox, supra note 11, at 359; see Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 170; Katrina C.
Rose, When is an Attempted Rape Not an Attempted Rape? When the Victim is a
Transsexual—Schwenk v. Hartford: The Intersection of Prison Rape, Title VII and
Societal Willingness to Dehumanize Transsexuals, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y
& L. 505, 538 (2001).
73
Brown, supra note 15, at 281-82; Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 168; Christine Peek, Breaking Out of the Prison Hierarchy: Transgender Prisoners, Rape, and
the Eighth Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2004); see also Dana
O’Day-Senior, The Forgotten Frontier? Healthcare for Transgender Detainees in
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detention, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 470 (2008)
(noting that transgender immigrants are particularly at-risk for detention and incarceration by ICE).
74
Correctional Populations, BUREAU JUST. STATS. (2009) available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/corr2tab.cfm.
75
Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, FED. BUREAU PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp (last updated Oct. 29, 2011).
76
Brown, supra note 15, at 281. The estimated rate for state facilities is 500
to 750 transsexual inmates. Id.
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Mędraś & Jóźków, supra note 30, at 412.
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nately, it appears that some of the factors—access to insurance, political representation, and judicial protection—that contribute to this disproportionate incarceration rate are improving, giving hope that these
rates will become more proportionate and transsexual individuals will
have a greater chance at social fulfillment.
II.

LEGAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS DEMONSTRATING
INCREASED ACCEPTANCE OF TRANSSEXUALS
A.

O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner

In February 2010, the U.S. Tax Court decided a precedent-setting
case in an “issue of first impression”78 that significantly advanced the
interests and legal recognition of transsexuals in the United States.
O’Donnabhain was born a genetic male with unambiguous male
genitalia.79 She lived as a man, and even raised a family, despite feeling very uncomfortable in the male gender role.80 While in psychotherapy, O’Donnabhain revealed her belief that she was really female
despite having a male body.81 Due to the discord between her subjective gender identity and objective sex, she suffered from depression,
low self-esteem, and anxiety.82 Consequently, O’Donnabhain’s psychiatrist started her on treatment in accordance with the WPATH
Standards of Care. O’Donnabhain completed the full course, culminating in the transformation from male to female, and responded positively both emotionally and physically.83 Because these procedures
were not covered by her health insurance or any government-funded
health-care system, O’Donnabhain itemized the costs as deductions on
her federal income tax return under I.R.C. § 213.84
I.R.C. § 213 permits taxpayers to deduct medical expenses that
are “not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care
of the taxpayer . . . to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent
of adjusted gross income.”85 Medical care includes “the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body. . . .”86 Medical
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 53 (2010).
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id.
See id. at 39-41.
Id. at 42, 49.
I.R.C. § 213(a) (2011).
Id. § 213(d)(1)(A).
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care does not, however, cover cosmetic surgery “unless the surgery or
procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from . . . a
congenital abnormality. . . .”87 The purpose of cosmetic surgery is
only to improve appearances; it does not “meaningfully promote the
proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.”88
The issue before the court was whether O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment hormone treatments and surgeries were merely cosmetic
alterations, or actually treated a disease or condition.
The court began its analysis by stating that tax deductions are
strictly confined to expenses for medical care that prevents or alleviates physical or mental defects or illnesses.89 The court ruled that
GID constituted a disease under § 213.90 The court then evaluated the
relationship between the malady and the treatment, based on two key
values. First, the court stated that in matters relating to the health care
of an individual, it gives deference to the medical judgments of the
practitioner who treated the patient-taxpayer.91 Second, given a legitimate medical concern, the treatment should “bear a direct or
proximate therapeutic relation” to the need.92 The tax court therefore
concluded that hormone therapy and genital reassignment surgery are
effective treatments for GID.93 However, the court noted that breast
augmentation surgery was not an effective treatment and was merely
cosmetic.94 The court, therefore, allowed O’Donnabhain to deduct the
expenditures for her transformation other than for breast augmentation.95
This decision exemplifies expanding protections and assistance
for transgender and transsexual interests in the United States, and
marks a trend toward easing the financial burdens of those wishing to
make the transformation. Furthermore, analyzing what is or is not
taxed, such as cigarettes and alcohol, or what is tax deductible, such
as charitable donations and necessary medical treatments, may serve
as a good measure for what the public values. In regards to transsexual inmates, this decision introduced two compelling factors related to
87

Id. § 213(d)(9)(A).
Id. § 213(d)(9)(B).
89
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 49 (2010).
90
Id. at 59, 63.
91
Id. at 64.
92
Id. at 65 (quoting Havey v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949)).
93
Id. at 66-67.
94
Id. at 72-73 (“Petitioner has not. . .adduced evidence that the breast augmentation surgery ameliorated a deformity within the meaning of section
213(d)(9)(A). . .[and] [t]he parties have stipulated that petitioner’s breast augmentation ‘did not promote the proper function of her breasts.’”)
95
Id. at 77.
88
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GID treatment: the care provided must meet the patient-specific diagnosis and only qualified and experienced medical personnel may
make decisions regarding that care.
B.

Positive Indications of Evolving Standards of
Decency

Transgender and transsexual people have not only made progress
in the courthouse, but also among the general population, in congressional halls, and with important initiatives that will improve their social standing and quality of life.
Electoral success is a very clear signal that a political and social
minority is gaining traction, demonstrating that the people trust them
to manage public affairs. In November 2010, Victoria Kolakowski
was elected to California’s Superior Court in Alameda County.96 Kolakowski underwent sex reassignment surgery in 1991 and is the first
openly transgender trial court judge in the United States.97 While it is
likely that other sitting judges are transgender, Kolakowski is the first
to be elected despite being open about her transsexual status and surgery.98 This victory demonstrates a remarkable step for transgender
people into the public arena. Kolakowski is the most prominent example of electoral success, but she is not alone in making political
headway for the transgender community.99
Legislation has also been developed at local, state, and federal
levels to provide explicit protections against gender identity-based
discrimination for transgender individuals. Since 1994, the Employment Nondiscrimination Act has been repeatedly put before Congress
in one form or another. Despite widespread support among House
members and the general public, it has not yet passed.100 While there
are no federal protections yet, thirteen states and the District of Co96

Woman Becomes Nation’s 1st Transgender Trial Judge, supra note 5; see
also Setbacks and Victories at the Polls: Transgender Candidates Win!, NAT’L CTR.
FOR
TRANSGENDER
EQUAL.
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://transequality.org/news10.html#midterm [hereinafter Transgender Candidates
Win!].
97
Woman Becomes Nation’s 1st Transgender Trial Judge, supra note 5.
98
Id. Admittedly, Kolakowski was elected in a county near San Francisco, a
municipality well-known for progressive policies and legislation regarding homosexuals and transsexuals.
99
Transgender Candidates Win!, supra note 96.
100
ENDA by the Numbers, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 2 (2010),
http://www.transequality.org/Resources/enda_by_the_numbers.pdf; as of 2010 there
were 202 representatives co-sponsoring the bill and according to a 2008 survey of
New York voters 78% were in favor of “anti-discrimination measures that include
gender identity and sexual orientation.” Id.
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lumbia have passed antidiscrimination laws prohibiting discrimination
based on gender identity. Unfortunately, these protect little more than
a third of the U.S. population.101
However, the circuit courts have demonstrated a progressive willingness to protect transsexuals under Title VII. The nation’s circuit
courts recognize that although the exact wording of Title VII may not
protect transsexuals, there are other characteristics of a transsexual’s
identity that can serve as the basis for a cause of action. Beginning
with Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit upheld a verdict in favor
of the transsexual plaintiff on grounds that the discrimination
stemmed from the plaintiff’s “failure to conform to sex stereotypes by
expressing less masculine and more feminine mannerisms and appearance.”102 However, this new interpretation is not without limits. An
employer may discharge a transsexual employee if that employee’s
gender identity expression raises an overriding concern. In Etsitty v.
Utah Transit Authority, the Tenth Circuit upheld the employer’s right
to fire a transsexual employee who used women’s public restrooms
despite still having male genitalia.103 The court recognized that the
Utah Transit Authority’s potential liability constituted a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for releasing Etsitty, despite the fact that
her using a women’s restroom was a nonconforming behavioral expression of her gender identity.104 Although a transsexual’s gender
identity and expression are protected, he or she must still be careful
not to cross practical boundaries between the sexes.
Homeless and evicted transsexuals also have hope for greater
housing protection. In January 2011, the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) announced new regulations that will
ensure that all eligible people, regardless of gender identity or sexual
orientation, can seek housing assistance.105 HUD based its decision in
101

Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet, supra note 57.
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); The court was
reflecting the values established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989) (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.”).
Id. at 572; see also Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2005)
(upholding a discrimination claim for a plaintiff alleging that he had been fired for
“grooming deficiencies” and not “acting masculine enough”).
103
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007).
104
Id.; see also Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 Fed. Appx.
492, 493-94 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding the school’s decision to prohibit a transsexual
from using a women’s bathroom until she “could prove completion of sex reassignment surgery” for safety reasons).
105
NCTE: HUD Proposes New Regulation –Includes Gender Identity, NAT’L
CENTER
FOR
TRANSGENDER
EQUAL.
(Jan.
21,
2011),
http://transequality.org/news.html.
102
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part on the data gathered in the 2009 survey by the National Center
for Transgender Equality (NCTE) and the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, which was “evidence demonstrating the dire need for
housing protections for the transgender community.”106 The new
regulations include provisions which will make clear that all HUD
public housing programs are open to eligible lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) families, prohibit landlords from asking
about gender identity or sexual orientation, and prohibit financial
lenders from discriminating on the basis of gender identity or sexual
orientation.107 In response to this monumental advancement in transgender and transsexual interests, Mara Kiesling, NCTE’s executive
director, said that these regulations will profoundly affect many lives
because “[e]very American needs and deserves a home.”108
The transgender community is also making headway in the healthcare arena. Transsexuals have great difficulty obtaining insurance
coverage when they disclose their transsexual status or any “transition-related medical history.”109 Fortunately, some health insurers are
beginning to provide coverage for transsexual procedures when there
is a demonstrated need.110 In 2008, the American Medical Association started requesting that health insurers cover more transgender and
transsexual health-care needs.111 The Affordable Care Act also makes
affording health insurance or receiving coverage under existing plans
easier for transgender people.112 What the bill provides for transsexuals is increased access to insurance for a group that has great difficulty
due to high rates of unemployment and poverty, protection from being
denied or dropped from coverage, and bans on discrimination.113
106
107

Id.; this data is discussed supra Part I.C.
NCTE: HUD Proposes New Regulations—Includes Gender Identity, supra

note 105.

108

Id.
Transgender Health and the Law: Identifying and Fighting Health Care
Discrimination,
TRANSGENDER
L.
CTR.
1
(July
2004),
http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/Health%20Law%20fact%20sheet.pdf.
According to a 1997 survey by the Transgender Community Health Project of the San
Francisco Department of Health, 52 percent of male-to-females were without insurance and 41 percent of female-to-males were without insurance. See Transgender
Issues: A Fact Sheet, supra note 57.
110
Cox, supra note 11, at 363.
111
AMA Supports Transgender Care, Hormones, Sex-Reassignment Therapy,
TEACHTHEFACTS.ORG
(June
19,
2008),
http://vigilance.teachthefacts.org/2008/06/ama-supports-transgender-carehormones.html.
112
Health Care Reform Signed into Law: How Will It Impact Transgender
People?, NAT’L CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.transequality.org/news10.html#hcr.
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Id.
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While this reform provides great assistance to millions of uninsured
Americans, including thousands of transsexuals, it contains no provisions covering transgender-specific treatments.114 Although this act
does not extend protections to the extent many transcommunity advocates desire, this reform still significantly reduces, and will hopefully
eliminate, the amount of discrimination transgender and transsexual
people face in the medical insurance industry.115
These advancements demonstrate that the American people are
increasingly accepting transgender and transsexual people, and the
representatives and industries that serve them are also beginning to
take heed. While this progress may not go as far as some might want,
these are steps in the right direction and provide a foundation for advancement in a number of areas, including the penal system.
III.

EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROVISIONS FOR INMATE HEALTH
CARE

The Eighth Amendment provides that there shall be no “cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”116 The Supreme Court has stated that
this amendment embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency. . . .”117 When the Founding Fathers wrote the Eighth Amendment they could not have contemplated the specific needs of prisoners today. Indeed, their only
goal in drafting the amendment was to “proscribe tortures and other
barbarous methods of punishment.”118 As a result, the protections
afforded to prisoners under the Eighth Amendment have necessarily
expanded along with society’s evolving standards of decency.119
Distilling the Eighth Amendment’s broad ideals, two requirements are placed on the justice and correctional systems. First, punishments are constitutional only if they are lawfully handed down by
the state; any conditions imposed by prison officials beyond what is
necessary to execute that sentence are a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.120 Second, state and federal governments have a consti114

Id.
Id.
116
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
117
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
118
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (explaining that the
clause forbidding cruel and unusual punishments “is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”).
120
See Dolovitch, supra note 10, at 883-85, 892-93; the Supreme Court has
declared that “[w]hile the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to
115
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tutional duty to provide for inmates’ basic needs;121 any refusal to
meet these needs is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.122 One
district court avowed its ardent belief that the Constitution protects the
inmate’s right to humane treatment, not in order to found a nation that
“coddles criminals,” but to form a society of decent people who “do
not allow other human beings in their custody to suffer needlessly
from serious illness or injury.”123
A.

Standard for Expanding Eighth Amendment
Protections

Courts recognize a strong moral and legal correlation between society’s standards of decency and Eighth Amendment protections.
This correlation may be helpful, if not necessary, in convincing the
courts that a class or minority is constitutionally entitled to greater
protections in the penal system. Although it has not yet crafted a test
with exacting elements, the Supreme Court has established general
guidelines that help demonstrate that society has changed its perception of the decency or humanity of specific penal conditions or punishments.124
The Court first suggested these guidelines in 1958 in Trop v. Dulles, where the plaintiff had lost his U.S. citizenship after being courtmartialed for wartime desertion during World War II.125 Concerned
that the Nationality Act of 1940 granted the military the power to decide who may “continue to be Americans and who shall be stateless,”126 the Court determined that “[c]itizenship is not a license that
expires upon misbehavior” unless voluntarily relinquished or expressly abandoned by language or conduct.127 The Court stated that
punishment wielded by the state must be within the appropriate scope
of the Eighth Amendment, which is neither “precise” nor “static.”128
Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment’s power and meaning is drawn
assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
121
Howell, supra note 24, at 145.
122
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (“When the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him
unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic needs…it
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment.”).
123
Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002).
124
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
125
Trop, 356 U.S. at 87.
126
Id. at 90.
127
Id. at 92.
128
Id. at 100-01.
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from “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”129 The Court reinstated Trop’s citizenship because
it found that to destroy an individual’s political existence and participation in organized society is “a form of punishment more primitive
than torture.”130
Later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment for murder131 and established guidelines based on the moral maxim it recognized eighteen years earlier.
The Court found an “assessment of contemporary values” reflected in
“objective indicia” to be helpful, though not conclusive, in evaluating
certain punishments.132 These objective indicia include legislative
response to judicial decisions,133 decisions by the “directly involved”
juries,134 and whether the punishment “comports with the basic concept of human dignity.”135 Using these rather broad criteria, the Court
found that society still placed great value on capital punishment and
did not rule that its use to punish the most heinous criminals was unconstitutional.136
One year later, the Supreme Court was asked to review capital
punishment’s constitutionality in regard to rape in Coker v. Georgia.137 The Court applied the analysis used in Gregg,138 but found that
where society still accepted capital punishment for murder, it was no
longer appropriate for rape.139 The specific findings were that legislatures in many states had responded to prior judicial decisions by
eliminating capital punishment for rape,140 at least nine out of ten juries did not sentence convicted rapists to death,141 and that death is

129

Id. at 101.
Id. at 101.
131
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
132
Id. at 173.
133
Id. at 179. The Supreme Court generally believes that the will and values
of the people are reflected in the actions of their elected representatives. See id. at
180-81.
134
Id. at 181 (The Court sees the jury’s value as “maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values and the penal system.” (quoting Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
135
Id. at 182; punishments must be penologically justified and not cause
gratuitous suffering. Id. at 183.
136
Id. (“[C]apital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct.”).
137
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 586 (1977).
138
Id. at 592.
139
Id. at 593-94.
140
Id. at 594.
141
Id. at 597.
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disproportionate to the crime.142 The Court, therefore, reversed
Coker’s death sentence.143
When the courts are convinced that society, as reflected by these
indicia, has sufficiently altered its valuation of a punishment’s suitability, constitutional interpretation may shift accordingly. This standard is not limited to evaluating punishments, but extends to analysis
of the penological conditions that accompany the implementation of
those punishments. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that society places
value on improving prison conditions, then the courts may ensure that
prison officials properly observe inmates’ new or expanded rights.
B.

Prison Health Care under the Eighth Amendment

As society shifted away from quick corporal punishment in favor
of longer incarceration, prison conditions imposed on inmates became
more important. Accordingly, Eighth Amendment interpretations had
to adapt as well. One very important change in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is that it now includes a requirement that inmates receive health care from the institutions that incarcerate them.144 The
Supreme Court determined that the principles the Eighth Amendment
embodies145 require the states to provide this care because inmates
rely on those authorities for their wellbeing.146
Although prisoners have a right to health care, this right is not unlimited. Prisons are not required to comply with all requests or expend all available resources to ensure that prisoners get every desirable creature comfort. Judge Posner affirmed this in Maggert v.
Hanks, stating that “[a] prison is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner medical care that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free person.”147
While the degree of care an inmate may or should receive is always a
142

Id. This is not to say that the Court was unsympathetic to the victims.
Indeed, it recognized that, following murder, this crime is the “ultimate violation of
self” and “undermines the community’s sense of security.” However, the Court was
also forced to recognize that “[l]ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape
victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not
beyond repair.” Id. at 597-98.
143
Id. at 600.
144
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
145
Id. at 102; Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual
Prisoner, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 27, 28 ((1995); Chin, supra note 19, at
165 (quoting Eighth Amendment principles from Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,
579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
146
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
147
Chin, supra note 19, at 162 (quoting Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671
(7th Cir. 1997)).
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matter of judicial discretion, there is no question that the inmate is
entitled to some degree of health care. People may ask why convicts
are entitled to health care when there are so many law-abiding citizens
who have no access to adequate, if any, health care. The simple,
though perhaps unpopular, answer is that the Supreme Court has established that inmates have an affirmative constitutional right to institutionally-provided health care, whereas the non-incarcerated population does not.148
Estelle v. Gamble established the general principle that all prisoners have a constitutional right to government-funded health care for
“serious medical needs.”149 Estelle addressed inmates generally, as
opposed to transsexual inmates specifically. The Supreme Court reasoned that denying medical treatment may result in “physical torture
or a lingering death,” the kind of suffering which serves no penological purpose.150 From this, the Court established the “deliberate indifference” standard, which states that the “deliberate indifference [of
prison authorities] to serious medical needs [of inmates] constitutes
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”151 A finding of deliberate indifference may result from a doctor improperly treating a
prisoner’s needs or other officials intentionally denying, delaying, or
interfering with a prisoner’s access to proper treatment.152 However, a
medical professional’s decision to not pursue a particular treatment
option does not, by itself, constitute cruel and unusual punishment.153
Negligence and malpractice are also insufficient to bring a claim under the Eighth Amendment.154 The Court, therefore, rejected Gamble’s claim for “lack of diagnosis and inadequate treatment” on the
grounds that, while greater diagnosis may have been necessary, it was
a medical decision not to pursue more.155 The prison doctors did not
deny him care; they just did not do everything possible to treat his
injury. This effectively established that only some treatment must be
provided for serious medical needs in order to comply with the Eighth
Amendment. This left open the question of how much care inmates
deserve and what reaches the level of a “serious medical need.”156
148

Id. at 166.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
150
Id. at 103 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
151
Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976)).
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Id. at 104-05.
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Id. at 107.
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Id. at 106.
155
Id. at 107; see also Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975)
(“Questions of medical judgment are not subject to judicial review.”).
156
Chin, supra note 19, at 166 (quoting Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162
(2d Cir. 2003)).
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Unfortunately, there is no clear standard by which to make bright line
determinations.157 Courts have wrestled with multiple definitions of
serious medical need that are similar only in that they can be easily
circumvented with a plausible excuse by a disinterested prison official.158
The Supreme Court further illuminated the deliberate indifference
standard in Farmer v. Brennan where it considered the complaint of a
preoperative male-to-female plaintiff who, despite her greater vulnerability, was placed in the prison’s male general population that had a
known “violent environment and a history of inmate assaults.”159 The
Supreme Court decided that a prison official is not deliberately indifferent unless he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.”160 The Court further elaborated that officials must
know facts “from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and actually draw that inference.161
Unfortunately, an objective standard of obviousness is inappropriate.162 The Court held that a plaintiff need not show that the official
intended the harm or knew of a specific risk, but only that the official
acted despite knowing there was a risk of harm to someone.163 The
Court, however, allowed officials to elude liability by showing that
even the obvious escaped them.164
These are the tests that transsexual inmates must satisfy in order
to obtain medical care for GID.165 The key issue is whether there are
sufficient facts for the prison official, most likely the prison doctor, to
157

Cox, supra note 11, at 348.
Id. One option is a need that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. (quoting Guttierez v. Peters, 111 F.3d
1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)). Another possibility is a need “where ‘the failure to treat
a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.’’” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060
(9th Cir. 1992)) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)).
159
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830-31 (1994).
160
Id. at 837.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 841; the Supreme Court unfortunately expressed no fear that without
an objective test prison officials could easily ignore obvious dangers to inmates. Id.
at 842. One commentator believes that this standard “creates incentives for officers
not to notice, despite the fact that when prison officials do not pay attention, prisoners
may be exposed to the worst forms of suffering and abuse.” Dolovitch, supra note 10,
at 892 (emphasis in original).
163
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; the Court reiterates later that the official must
actually prove that he was unaware of an obvious risk to an inmate’s health or safety.
Id. at 844.
164
Id. at 843 n.8.
165
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 62, n.40 (2010).
158

HEALTH MATRIX

250

[Vol. 22: 227]

know that the inmate is transsexual and draw the inference that treatment for GID is needed.166 This question of fact may initially seem to
require that the inmate prove that he or she is a transsexual suffering
from GID. However, it actually requires that the prisons or prison
systems have medical staff available that can appropriately diagnose
transsexualism because a lay inmate cannot ground a claim on a mere
self-diagnosis. A proper medical diagnosis will resolve that question
of fact and provide a clear basis from which the physician can draw
the required inference that the inmate requires treatment.
There is, of course, no constitutional requirement to provide inmates with nonessential medical procedures.167 Given that many nonessential procedures are not covered by health insurance for the taxpaying public who pay the inmates’ medical bills, it would be inappropriate to cover such procedures for inmates.168 Judge Posner
viewed GID care as nonessential, saying that “gender dysphoria is not
generally considered a severe enough condition to warrant expensive
treatment at the expense of others than the person suffering from
it.”169 Fortunately, medical science has progressed in the fifteen years
since Judge Posner’s writing, and now seven U.S. Courts of Appeals
and the Supreme Court have recognized that GID qualifies as a serious medical need requiring appropriate medical attention.170 That
alone is sufficient to warrant some treatment for diagnosed transsexuals. But the specific level of treatment required largely remains unanswered. The cases that have attempted to resolve the issue are discussed below.

166

See Praylor v. Texas Dep’t Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir.
2005); Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997).
167
Chin, supra note 19, at 151-52 & n.6. (“The author is not suggesting that
GID is not the right choice for many transgender individuals. The author is arguing
that inmates should not benefit from surgeries that are arguably not necessary to keep
them alive.”).
168
Id.
169
Maggert, 131 F.3d at 672.
170
O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 62, n.40; see also De’lonta v. Angelone, 330
F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003);Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir.
1987); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325-27 (8th Cir. 1988); Phillips v. Michigan
Dep’t of Corr., 932 F. 2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829
(1994); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995); Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000); Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App’x 793, 794 (9th Cir.
2001); Praylor, 430 F.3d at 1209; Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671.
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Current Prison Policies Regarding Transsexual
Inmate Health Care

Many medical uncertainties are resolved by the policies that legislatures or administrative departments draft as guidance for prison officials and medical staff. These policies generally limit the medical
care a prison physician can administer.171 The health care that transsexuals receive for GID is very restricted. The Federal Bureau of
Prisons’ policy states:
It is the policy of the Bureau to maintain a transsexual
inmate at the level of change existing upon admission.
Should the [Bureau] determine that either progressive
or regressive treatment changes are indicated, the
Medical Director must approve these prior to implementation. The use of hormones to maintain secondary sexual characteristics may be continued at approximately the same levels as prior to incarceration
(with appropriate documentation from community
physicians/hospitals) and with the Medical Director’s
approval.172
This policy, and others like it, freezes the degree of care available to a
transsexual inmate. This might be acceptable for those transsexuals
who were receiving treatment before incarceration, but not for inmates
who might be diagnosed while in prison. In some cases, incarceration
might be an inmate’s first opportunity for real diagnosis and health
care.
While inflexible policies may seem unfavorable, having no written policy may be even worse, because it subjects transsexual inmates
to the risk that prison officials, with full discretion, will make deci171

Policy
Documents,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsPolicyLoc (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). It
is worth noting that these healthcare policies range between three and seventeen years
old and are possibly based on outdated scientific studies. A 2009 survey reported that
nineteen states have no polices for managing transsexual inmates and twenty-five
states including the District of Columbia and the Bureau of Prisons had polices.
Brown & McDuffie, supra note 15, at 283-84.
172
Sultan, supra note 53, at 1218 n.171; this policy is currently under attack
in federal court and may likely be repealed in favor of a more flexible standard.
Jillian T. Weiss, Incarcerated Transgender Woman Can Pursue Case for Appropriate
Medical
Care,
THE
BILERIC
PROJECT
(June
11,
2010),
http://www.bilerico.com/2010/06/incarcerated_transgender_woman_can_pursue_case
_for.php.
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sions “primarily informed by bias or other inappropriate considerations.”173 But even if there are written policies, the degree of understanding of the policy author presents yet another problem. Despite
the fact that these policies explicitly address treatment standards for
transsexual inmates suffering from GID, there is no requirement that
anyone involved in the drafting process have any experience with GID
care or transsexual issues.174
Providing transsexual inmates with the appropriate level of treatment necessitates a change in health-care policy on both the state and
federal levels. The patchwork of state policies and troublesome adherence to those policies demonstrates the risks involved in mixing
flat prohibitions and too much official discretion. The goal, therefore,
should be to craft a universal policy that gives prison medical officials
the latitude to provide the health care necessary to treat transsexual
inmates based on their individual medical needs, but includes sufficient guidelines to balance what the inmate may request and what the
doctor may provide. The policy should also be written or reviewed by
medical and legal professionals who have experience dealing with
GID needs and issues.
D.

Past Decisions on Transsexual Inmate Health Care
Point to a Better Policy

Over the past two decades, the federal circuit courts have decided
several cases dealing with treatments for inmates suffering from GID.
Although not all were decided in the transsexual inmate’s favor, each
exposed the strengths and weaknesses of current policies and official
actions. These cases also highlight the remarkable difference between
some care and adequate care. Taken together, these cases suggest

173

Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 197; the risk of harm to inmates from a lack of
official policy has been demonstrated in other circumstances, such as inadequate
housing, where courts have found the prison officials liable: “As a result of an insufficient number of jailers, the lack of written standards or policies by the jail administration concerning jail inspection and the inadequate communication between the jail
floors, the security of the jail and the safety of the inmates is put into serious jeopardy.” Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1269 (S.D. W. Va. 1981). The court
also found those administrators neglected their medical duties because they did not
have medical professionals screen or examine inmates upon arrival, sufficient medical
supplies, an equipped medical facility with medical personnel present, or the ability to
arrange care by psychiatrists, psychologists, or other mental health personnel. Id. at
1272-73; Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[The warden] refused to hear Cuoco’s complaints, remarking that Cuoco ‘should act like a man the
way God intended.’”).
174
Tarzwell, supra note 52, at 208.
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elements for a better medical standard that balance the respective constitutional rights and duties of inmates and officials.
1.

The Elements of a Better Policy for Trans
sexual Inmate Health Care

The first important standard for treating a transsexual inmate’s serious medical need is requiring prison doctors to continue hormone
treatments that the inmate pursued prior to incarceration. This requirement is not only to provide GID-specific treatment, but also to
prevent the severe physical and mental withdrawal that may arise
from discontinuing treatment.175 De’lonta v. Angelone demonstrated
the great dangers to an inmate’s physical and mental health caused by
discontinuing hormone therapy, and, therefore, the necessity of continuing ongoing treatments.176 Prior to incarceration, and even at a
previous facility, De’lonta received estrogen, but upon transfer to another prison, the prison doctor immediately discontinued her estrogen
treatment under a new state DoC policy that prohibited both medical
and surgical treatment for GID.177 However, this new policy called
for first tapering off hormone dosage before finally discontinuing
hormones altogether.178 Cutting off the estrogen so abruptly caused
both psychological and physical suffering.179 De’lonta began to suffer
from nausea and depression and developed an intense urge to mutilate
herself, including attempts at autocastration.180 Consequently, she
brought an Eighth Amendment claim alleging denial of adequate
medical treatment for GID.181 The district court decided that her
claim was merely a disagreement over medical judgment, which is not
actionable under the Eighth Amendment, and that “De’lonta was receiving some treatment.”182 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that
even if GID were not a serious medical need, the self-mutilation resulting from terminating the estrogen treatment certainly was a serious
medical need requiring treatment.183 It also said that while “some
treatment” was provided—counseling and antidepressants—and may
have alleviated the condition, it was not provided for that purpose or
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Cox, supra note 11, at 361.
De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 634.
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reasonably expected to prevent further harm.184 The Court, therefore,
ordered the prison to provide her “constitutionally adequate treatment.”185 This decision not only demonstrates recognition of GID as
a serious medical need but also that not treating GID can produce secondary serious medical needs that can be even more harmful. More
importantly, this court recognized the gulf between some care and
adequate care.
The second element follows logically from the first: if an inmate
may continue treatment for a condition he was properly diagnosed
with prior to incarceration, then inmates who are diagnosed after incarceration should not be denied care either. It also follows from this
that prison officials should not deny diagnosis requests in order to
avoid having to provide any treatment that might follow. In Brooks v.
Berg, the plaintiff had felt that she had a female gender identity since
childhood, but only became aware of GID after she was incarcerated,
and realized that it was the only medical treatment that would alleviate her suffering.186 After repeated unanswered requests up the administrative chain of prison authority, Brooks claimed a failure to
provide “necessary medical treatment for [her] serious medical need,”
including diagnostic examinations.187 On appeal, the district court
recognized that Brooks only requested “minimal, though appropriate
treatments and all necessary examinations/testing,” but that prison
officials had reduced her requests to just “body altering requests,”
which were rejected.188 Brooks was simply requesting to see a qualified doctor who could determine what treatment, if any, was necessary.189 The court noted that the prison officials also misinterpreted
the Federal Bureau of Prisons-drafted policy’s silence regarding
whether previously undiagnosed inmates could receive treatment as a
prohibition on providing care to transsexuals diagnosed in prison.190
Inmates diagnosed with other physical or mental illnesses are not denied treatment “simply because their conditions were not diagnosed
prior to incarceration.”191 The court concluded that a “blanket denial
184

Id. at 635.
Id. at 636. However, having remanded the case for further proceedings,
the court declined to “comment on the type of treatment, if any, to which De’lonta is
entitled.” Id.
186
Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
187
Id. at 304, 306. In her testimony, Brooks stated that “I was never seen by
medical staff, which prevented them from determining whether or not such treatment
was necessary in my case specifically.” Id. at 306.
188
Id. at 305-06.
189
Id. at 306.
190
Id. at 312.
191
Id.
185
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of medical treatment” is contrary to the Eighth Amendment. This
decision placed an obligation on prison officials to provide inmates
diagnostic examinations in order to determine whether a serious
medical need that requires treatment is indicated.192
The necessary corollary of this rule is that when an inmate is not
diagnosed as a transsexual suffering from GID or as not needing a
particular treatment, there is no Eighth Amendment violation for denying that inmate the desired care.193 In Praylor v. Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, the plaintiff claimed that he was unconstitutionally denied treatment for his GID.194 The court rejected his claim because prison officials demonstrated that Praylor did not qualify for
medical treatment under the prison’s policy for treating transsexual
inmates. The officials also demonstrated that providing hormones
would interfere with prison security and that psychotherapy treatment
was available to transsexual inmates.195 Judging from the policy,
which required psychological screening of transsexual inmates and
hormone therapy only for medical necessity196 —diagnostic tools used
by the WPATH Standards of Care197—an experienced official was
involved in the determination.
Brooks also speaks to the final element of a better universal policy: ensuring that the appropriate prison officials make the decisions
concerning transsexual inmate health care. In requiring diagnostic
examinations, the court stated further that a medical professional, and
not a lay administrator, must determine any treatment for the inmate
patient.198 Furthermore, treatment decisions, whether to provide or
deny care, must be based on the “sound medical judgment” of the
medical professional.199 The court noted that even Brooks, who believed that a wide variety of surgeries may be appropriate, recognized
what the prison officials did not, that only a “qualified medical professional” could determine what treatment was “minimal though appropriate.”200 This standard arose from a decision the previous year in
Kosilek v. Maloney, where the court stated that “adequate care” meant
treatment by “qualified personnel” in accordance with “prudent pro-

192
193

2005).

194
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id.
Praylor v. Texas Dep’t Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir.
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 1, 8.
Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 312.
Id. at 305.
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fessional standards in the community.”201 However, the court recognized that other prudent and practical concerns, such as the need to
maintain security and safety, might override an inmate’s constitutional
right to GID treatment.202 But if an official decides that his duty to
ensure an inmate’s safety must override the duty to provide adequate
care to that inmate, only a court can decide whether there is an Eighth
Amendment violation.203 While this standard does not grant an absolute right to adequate care, it still protects inmate patients from decisions based on inappropriate considerations or troublesome interpretations of official policy or medical practice.204
2.

Cost is Not Grounds for Denying Treatment

When legal arguments are exhausted, some prison officials try defending their decisions to deny medical treatment on practical
grounds. Judge Posner in Maggert v. Hanks asserted that prisons had
no duty to provide treatments for GID in part because they are “protracted and expensive” procedures, and the cost of full transformation
can reach $100,000 for a male-to-female procedure.205 In support of
some judicial determinations that attending physicians are solely responsible for health-care decisions, medical advocates are quick to
point out that doctors are trained to not consider cost or pass judgment
as to whether the patient deserves the treatment.206 Leaving medical
decisions to those concerned with the budget only ensures that needless suffering will ensue.207 This would also violate the “sound medical judgment” standard established in Brooks.208
Furthermore, prisons readily provide other costly procedures to
inmates. In 2005, the DoC estimated that one coronary bypass costs
$37,000 and one kidney transplant costs $33,000, whereas it estimated
that complete sex reassignment would cost only $20,000.209 In 2004,
the DoC paid only $2,300 for hormone therapy for two inmates, but
201

Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002).
Id. at 162.
203
Id.
204
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976).
205
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1997). Judge Posner,
however, said the decision was not based solely on cost, but rather that, at that time,
GID was not widely recognized as a sufficient serious medical need. Id. at 672.
206
Chin, supra note 19, at 174.
207
See id.
208
Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
209
Cox, supra note 11, at 361. Between 2005 and 2007, five kidney transplants were performed. Id. Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 837 (E.D. Wis.
2010).
202
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paid $2.5 million for inmates to take antipsychotic drugs.210 Providing expensive procedures such as those, but denying substantially less
expensive and intensive treatments, like hormone therapy, appears to
be a decision based on considerations other than the patient’s medical
needs or even cost. This also clearly violates the Brooks standard.
Fortunately, at least one federal court has completely foreclosed
prison officials from taking a particular treatment’s cost into account
when deciding what care is available to an inmate.211 In Kosilek v.
Maloney, the plaintiff was a transsexual who suffered from depression
that led to suicide and autocastration attempts.212 Having been denied
care by Maloney, Kosilek filed suit against him in his official capacity
as the DoC commissioner, asking the court for provisions that would
be made obligatory a year later in Brooks.213 Kosilek simply wanted a
doctor experienced with GID to diagnose and prescribe adequate
treatment, and for the prison officials to provide that treatment.214
Unlike in Brooks and De’lonta v. Angelone, Maloney adopted his own
policy for GID care that froze care upon incarceration.215 Maloney
adopted this policy due to a variety of administrative concerns: security, public and political criticism, and that GID treatments may be an
inappropriate use of taxpayer money.216 The court recognized that
security is a legitimate concern, but declared that it is
“[im]permissible to deny an inmate adequate medical care because it
is costly.”217 If Maloney denied Kosilek adequate care for GID based
on “cost or controversy,” he violated the Eighth Amendment.218 This
outcome protects transsexual inmate patients from administrative decisions based on inappropriate considerations and compels prison officials to rely on the sound medical judgment of experienced medical
professionals for diagnosis and treatment.
Even if cost was a legitimate concern for prison administrators,
the care that is currently accessible, and the care that would be accessible under the more liberal standard described below, is not cost pro210

Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 837. Hormone therapy only costs the DoC
about $300 to $1000 per inmate per year, whereas the antipsychotic drug Quetiapine
costs between $2,555 and $2,920 per inmate per year. Id.
211
Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D. Mass. 2002).
212
Id. at 158, 165.
213
Id. at 159; Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
214
Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
215
Although this policy was similar to the policy established by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Maloney developed it after consulting with DoC doctors and attorneys, and was not merely employing an already established policy. Id.
216
Id. at 162.
217
Id. at 161.
218
Id. at 162.
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hibitive because of four important limiting factors. First, to receive
treatment, a prison doctor must diagnose the inmate patient as a transsexual suffering from GID.219 Second, the quantum of diagnosed
transsexual inmates is miniscule.220 Third, not all transsexual prisoners will want treatment or have the same medical needs.221 Fourth,
despite Judge Posner’s concerns,222 given the safety risks,223 it is unreasonable to assume that transsexuals will commit crimes just to receive medical treatment.224 With enforceable diagnosis guidelines,
low numbers, variable need, and no incentive to abuse the system,
even if all transsexual inmates were provided greater care, the total
costs would not be prohibitive compared to the rest of the health-care
budget.225
These medical and cost considerations form a strong foundation
for a better policy. These are broad ideals that do not prohibit refinement as greater scientific understanding of transsexualism develops
and medical treatments improve. A policy built on this foundation
will meet an inmate’s specific medical needs and provide proper guidance to prison officials as to when treatment must be provided. It will
also conform to both the medical consensus on GID treatment (as
codified in the Standards of Care226) and balance the inmates’ constitutional rights with the prison officials’ constitutional duties. Courts,
therefore, only need to be convinced that such a policy is effective at
treating GID, and that society values its implementation.
IV.

The Eighth Amendment Requires Gender Identity
Disorder Treatment

That the Eighth Amendment requires care for prisoners’ basic
needs is clear.227 While treatment for GID may not seem like a basic
need, adequate medical treatment for serious medical needs certainly

219

STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 3.
Brown & McDuffie, supra note 15, at 281-282.
221
Cox, supra note 11, at 360-61.
222
Judge Posner stated, “[w]e do not want transsexuals committing crimes
because it is the only route to obtaining a cure.” Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670,
672 (7th Cir. 1997).
223
See infra Part IV.E.
224
There are no reported cases of transsexuals committing crime just to receive treatment to support Posner’s concern. Sultan, supra note 53, at 1207-06.
225
Cox, supra note 11, at 360-62.
226
See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13.
227
See supra Part III.B.
220
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is.228 Estelle v. Gamble established that prison officials must provide
only some care.229 But “some care” might practically mean “no care”
if that care does not adequately or effectively address the severity of
the serious medical need. While there is no constitutional requirement
that treatment must cure an inmate’s condition or illness, the care provided must at least mitigate the inmate’s suffering while he or she is
in the state’s custody.230 The duties imposed on prison officials by
this requirement for appropriate mitigating care may be interpreted in
two ways.
One interpretation says that at least a minimum of adequate care
is required. This provides a lower limit for the degree of care officials
must provide, below which is a denial of care that “constitutes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”231 However, it does not establish an upper limit on the care that inmates may demand. This interpretation, therefore, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s qualification
to the deliberate indifference standard that medical judgments not to
pursue a particular treatment are not grounds for a claim.232
The second, and perhaps more appropriate, interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment requires only the minimum treatment required to
effectively treat the condition. This maintains the lower limit needed
to protect inmates’ constitutional rights; in fact, it may raise it slightly.
However, it caps treatment at the point where the serious medical
problem has been cured or substantially alleviated. This view is in
accordance with the tax court’s belief that the treatment should “bear
a direct or proximate therapeutic relation” to the need.233 This is also
a flexible policy in line with the Standards of Care that meets the patient’s specific needs. If a transsexual inmate requires only psychiatric therapy to alleviate GID, then that is all that the Eighth Amendment requires, and all that prison officials must provide. However, if
in another case the inmate cannot be adequately treated with psychiat228
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); see also Maggert v.
Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (“The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to forbid
prisons to ignore the serious medical, including psychiatric, afflictions of prisoners.”).
229
See supra Part III.B.
230
Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“‘[P]resently
medically necessary’ describes treatment ‘without which an inmate could not be
maintained without significant risk of either further serious deterioration of his/her
condition or significant reduction of the chance of possible repair after release, or
without significant pain or discomfort.’”).
231
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)).
232
Id. at 107.
233
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 65 (2010) (quoting Havey v.
Comm’r, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949)).
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ric therapy, then, upon proper diagnosis, hormones should be provided.
The Ninth Circuit used a standard for adequate care regarding
other aspects of inmate care that reflects many of the same values as
the second interpretation.234 In Johnson v. Lewis, the plaintiff inmates, suing as a class, alleged that their Eighth Amendment right to
official provision for their basic needs was violated.235 On two occasions following prison unrest, the inmates were kept out in the yard,
exposed to extreme elements with few provisions for protection,
waste, hygiene, or nourishment for extended periods of time.236 The
district court rejected their claim under a standard of care similar to
that expressed in Estelle v. Gamble.237 Because the prison officials
had provided some protection from the elements, food, water, medical
care, and sanitation, they were not liable for violating their Eighth
Amendment duties because they did not cause sufficient harm.238 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court because the prison
officials meeting “some needs” at “some times” did not establish that
sufficient or adequate care was in fact provided.239 While the officials
were not obligated to provide every possible amenity, they had a duty
to meet the inmates’ basic needs.
The Tenth Circuit went a little further, holding that a prison official may be liable when he makes efforts “reasonably calculated to
reduce the risk [of harm]” that fail, if he intentionally refuses reasonable alternatives and the risk continues.240 Applying this to transsexual inmate patients, if the prison doctor provides psychotherapy, but
the inmate’s depression or urges for self-mutilation continue, the doctor may be liable under the Eighth Amendment for not providing the
hormones necessary to alleviate the suffering.
A narrower interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is most appropriate for advancing transsexual inmates’ health-care interests.
Although it may eliminate access to surgical sex reassignment, it
strengthens the right to sex-appropriate hormone therapy. Using this
interpretation in conjunction with the case law discussed above,241 a
better policy for treating inmates with GID can be crafted.

234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

See Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 729.
Id. at 729-31.
See supra Part III.B.
Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731.
Id. at 732.
Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 2008).
See supra Part III.D.
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Sound Medical Diagnosis without Discrimination

Inmates’ have a constitutional right to the care they need. The
first step to protecting that right is ensuring that prison officials can
provide the proper treatment without judicial intervention. The sooner
an inmate’s medical condition is treated, the less pain and suffering
the inmate will experience.242 Prison officials can only treat a serious
medical need if it has been diagnosed by an experienced medical professional. An inmate’s right to sound medical diagnosis was recognized in Brooks v. Berg.243 But the court in Brooks left open the questions of what is sound medical judgment and what is an experienced
medical professional.
The WPATH Standards of Care state that, in treating patients with
GID, an experienced medical professional, at the very least, is one
who has “basic general clinical competence in diagnosis and treatment
of mental or emotional disorders.”244 Specialization experience with
GID requires an advanced degree in clinical behavioral science, specialized training in assessing DSM-IV sexual disorders—especially
those disorders that implicate Eighth Amendment concerns, such as
GID—competence in psychotherapy, and continuing GID treatment
education.245 If these are the minimum requirements for competently
diagnosing and treating GID patients, it stands to reason that only a
medical professional possessing these qualifications has the sound
medical judgment required to treat a transsexual inmate. Furthermore,
given that the Standards of Care are WPATH’s interpretation of the
international medical community’s consensus on GID treatment,246
sound medical judgment for treating a transsexual inmate must reflect
the Standards of Care, though balanced against the legitimate practical
concerns of the prison environment. If examined by a qualified medical professional, a diagnosis is a simple matter and only requires
meeting the clinical threshold described in the Standards of Care247
242
None of the courts in the cases discussed supra Part III explicitly recognized that in the time between the plaintiff filing the complaint and the court’s final
ruling the plaintiff is still suffering from GID symptoms and denied effective care
unless temporary injunctive relief was granted. In the case of Kosilek v. Maloney, it
was ten years before a final ruling was handed down. 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D.
Mass. 2002).
243
See Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
244
STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 6.
245
Id. at 6-7.
246
Id. at 1.
247
Id. at 2 (stating that “[a] clinical threshold is passed when concerns, uncertainties, and questions about gender identity persist during a person’s development,
become so intense as to seem to be the most important aspect of a person’s life, or
prevent the establishment of a relatively unconflicted gender identity”).
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and comparing the patient’s indicated symptoms to the DSM-IV
guidelines.248
Another open question is which prisoners are entitled to a diagnosis. All inmates who feel that they have a gender-sex incongruity are
entitled to be examined by a medical professional and, if indicated,
diagnosed as a transsexual. There are two key reasons for requiring
universal access to sound medical diagnosis. First, as stated above, an
undiagnosed serious medical need cannot be treated. Second, many
transsexuals only “come to terms with their true gender identity during mid-life.”249 In some cases, prison might be the first time these
inmates have access to real health care and the opportunity to have
any medical problems diagnosed and treated. In any case, though, it
would be wrong for prison officials to deny an inmate the opportunity
to be examined in order to avoid treating a serious medical need. It is
important to note, however, that a medical examination will not necessarily yield a GID diagnosis. If upon examination the inmate patient is diagnosed as suffering from GID, then the medical professional has an array of effective, though limited, treatment options at
his disposal to which the patient may then be constitutionally entitled.
B.

Psychotherapy is Some Care but Not Necessarily
Adequate Care

Psychotherapy is the first and least intensive treatment for GID, as
prescribed by the WPATH Standards of Care.250 The Standards of
Care state that not all transsexuals require every step of the treatment
sequence to become comfortable with their incongruity, and that not
all will require psychotherapy to move on to hormone treatment.251
The real therapeutic value of psychotherapy is that it aids the “discovery and maturational processes that enable self-comfort.”252 However,
despite the valuable role it plays in providing comfort, psychotherapy
is not a cure for GID.253 This is evident from the fact that many transsexuals still pursue the more intensive hormonal and surgical therapies despite successful psychotherapy. It has also been demonstrated
in many of the cases discussed above. For example: O’Donnabhain
only found relief after starting hormone treatment;254 De’lonta experi248
249
250
251
252
253
254

See supra notes 35-36, and accompanying text.
Howell, supra note 24, at 180.
See STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 13, at 3, 11.
See id.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 12.
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 39 (2010).
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enced severe psychological deterioration after being denied hormones
despite the fact that psychotherapy was available;255 but Praylor had to
be satisfied with only psychotherapy because he was not diagnosed as
needing anything more.256 Despite rejecting arguments that prisons
have a duty to provide extensive care for GID, even Judge Posner
pointed out that while “less drastic treatments are available for this
condition” only the more intensive treatments have been successful in
treating it.257
Given that psychotherapy is not very intensive, relatively easy to
provide, and unlikely to create security concerns,258 prison officials
routinely provide it to transsexual inmates.
C.

Prescribing Hormones Following Sound Medical
Diagnosis

According to the WPATH protocols, following psychotherapy,
gender-specific hormones are the next level of treatment.259 The
Standards of Care place great emphasis on hormone therapy due to its
proven medical effectiveness and widespread patient satisfaction with
the results. Hormones are generally necessary for “successful living
in the new gender” and for reducing “psychiatric co-morbidity.”260
Hormones alleviate GID symptoms by altering physical characteristics to align with the desired gender.261 In many, if not most, cases,
hormones are sufficient to relieve GID symptoms, thereby removing
the need to pursue the more intensive and permanent surgeries.262
Being incarcerated is an abrupt life change, and it presents many
health risks to transsexuals. The Standards of Care insist that hormone treatment should not be discontinued.263 Discontinuing hormone therapy can cause emotional instability, “regression of hormon255
256
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ally-induced” physical changes, and severe psychological problems,
including “depression, anxiety and suicidality.”264 Rapid discontinuation may cause even more severe health risks.265 The cases discussed
above in Parts III.B and III.D have also clearly demonstrated the troubles transsexual inmates experience when they are denied hormone
therapy.266 Fortunately, many courts have recognized the value that
hormone therapy has for transsexuals suffering from GID.
Given the demonstrable effectiveness of hormone therapy and the
risks of denying it, the Eighth Amendment must provide that prison
medical personnel prescribe sex-appropriate hormones to all diagnosed transsexual inmate patients. This does not mean that all transsexuals are automatically entitled to hormones. The Eighth Amendment only requires effective treatment for a serious medical need.
The inmate must actually have a serious medical need, diagnosed by a
medical professional. Not providing treatment to one who has not
been diagnosed as having a serious and treatable medical condition
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.267
All inmates diagnosed with GID should have access to the necessary treatments. Prisons are currently only required to provide hormones to those who medically qualify, but it is inconsistent with the
principles embodied in the Eighth Amendment to universally deny
these treatments to all transsexuals.268
D.

Sex Reassignment Surgery is Not Required

Currently, no prison facilities in the United States have policies
that provide sex reassignment surgeries (SRS), either genital or nongenital, to transsexual inmates.269 Based on a standard that only requires minimum effective treatments and not fully curing long-term
conditions, SRS is beyond the medical needs of most transsexual inmates.270
264
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The minimum effective requirement limits prisoners’ claims because the treatment provided should not exceed that which is necessary to alleviate or cure the condition while the inmate is incarcerated.
This comports with the Estelle qualification that a medical decision
not to pursue a treatment option does not violate the Eighth Amendment 271 and Posner’s opinion that prisoners should not receive care
that is generally unavailable to nonincarcerated persons.272 SRS is not
medically available or necessary for many transsexuals,273 and, due to
prejudicial difficulties in the workplace, many cannot even afford it.274
Surgery is not necessary for all GID cases, and the WPATH Standards of Care recommend reserving it for only the most serious
cases.275 Most transsexuals are able to successfully complete their
transitions without it.276 Hormones alleviate most symptoms and ease
suffering without causing serious complications, except for when
those hormones are discontinued. Surgery creates a much greater risk
of harm. Although desperate transsexuals may believe that surgery is
a “life saving measure[],”277 the Eighth Amendment does not require
it.
There are also significant issues beyond medical necessity. The
effectiveness of surgical procedures for GID patients is still under
study.278 Furthermore, the many postoperative complications that
may follow give rise to both physical and legal problems.279 While a
well-performed surgery may itself entail little risk for the patient,280
the potential future health complications can be severe.281 Surgery
does not necessarily produce fully functioning sex organs, and some
genital constructions may detach282 or collapse,283 requiring extensive
rioration of his/her condition or significant reduction of the chance of possible repair
after release, or without significant pain or discomfort.’”).
271
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272
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273
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274
NTDS, supra note 59, at 2.
275
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that surgery was not necessary for finding comfort with his identity saying: “I don’t
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reconstruction to repair the damage.284 To require SRS puts officials
in a constitutional bind. If the Eighth Amendment prohibits conduct
that may cause a prisoner to suffer, it should not require a drastic
treatment that may lead to harm or illness for an inmate.
A study published in February 2011 that followed postoperative
transsexuals in Sweden revealed many problems plaguing transsexuals who completed SRS.285 The study stated that prior data concerning postoperative transsexuals was inconsistent and inconclusive, with
some reporting improvement both psychiatrically and psychologically
following hormone therapy and SRS and others reporting “regrets,
psychiatric morbidity, and suicide attempts.”286 Following 324 Swedish transsexuals who had SRS over a thirty-year period, the study reported that these individuals had three times the risk of death,287
higher rates of suicide, cardiovascular disease, malignancies,288 increased risk of hospitalization for non-GID psychiatric disorders, and
greater rates of conviction than the general population.289 The report’s authors suggested that postoperative transsexuals have greater
health problems because many avoid the health-care system out of
fear of discrimination and that they generally had “more psychiatric
ill-health than the general population prior to the sex reassignment,”
which may continue even after successful transformation.290
Refusing SRS to inmates is inconsistent with the O’Donnabhain
decision. However, there is a difference between IRC § 213 and the
Eighth Amendment. Section 213 allows tax deductions for all effective treatments for GID. There is no cap to § 213’s allowances, as
long as the expenses relate to medically effective procedures. The
Eighth Amendment, however, does not require therapies that exceed
what is necessary to treat the inmate’s condition while he or she is
incarcerated.
An exception may be permissible for inmates sentenced to life
without parole. The WPATH Standards of Care require a successful
283
Tobin, supra note 11, at 399 (quoting Lynn Conway, Postoperative Care
Following Vaginoplasty (SRS), ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LAB, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN
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2009)).
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286
Id. at 2.
287
Id. at 4.
288
Id. at 5.
289
Id. at 6.
290
Id.

2012]

SETTING GENDER IDENTITY FREE

267

twelve-month minimum life experience in order to qualify for SRS.291
This is a test for how well the transsexual individual functions in society as the intended sex. For life prisoners, the prison is their life experience and is the community in which they will live and die.292 Given
how rare these cases are, there may be little harm in extending the
degree of care. Therefore the standard that a long-term condition need
not be cured in prison may be relaxed because the inmate may never
find medical relief outside.
E.

Appropriate Housing for Transsexual Inmates

If sex-altering treatment is provided, transsexual inmates will require special housing accommodations to protect them from inmate
predation. Although Judge Posner rejected pleas for medical relief, he
recognized the physical dangers associated with being a transsexual
and affirmed the right to protection “from harassment by prisoners
who wish to use [transsexual inmates] as a sexual plaything.”293
Unfortunately, housing for transsexual inmates presents a confusing paradox because all available options present constitutional problems.294 Placing transsexual inmates in the general population creates
a serious risk of violent assault. But placing those inmates in administrative segregation for protection may punish them beyond the sentences for their crimes.295
As one commentator stated, “[p]rison rapes do not occur in a vacuum.”296 Prison society operates according to a “code” that divides
the strong from the weak and the dominant from the subjugated along
lines of “fighting ability and manliness.”297 Weaker or more stereotypically feminine inmates are at the bottom of prison society and at
the highest risk of victimization.298 The threat of sexual violence in
prisons is so well recognized that Congress passed legislation to combat it: the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003.299 The Act’s findings
estimated that, in the twenty years prior to enactment, over one mil291
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lion inmates had suffered some form of sexual abuse, and that inmates
with mental conditions or illness were especially susceptible to attack.300 Transsexuals are at substantially greater risk of violent and
sexual assault in prison due to their femininity or gender nonconforming behavior or appearance. A survey of California prisons revealed
that 59 percent of transgender inmates reported sexual assault, compared to just 4 percent of the general population.301 A national survey,
reported that 16 percent were physically assaulted and 15 percent
sexually assaulted.302
Administrative segregation, as the name implies, is commonly
used for punishing misbehaving inmates or isolating the most dangerous convicts.303 Placing transsexual inmates in administrative segregation because of their transsexual status and not for any misconduct,
even if it is for their protection, effectively punishes them for being
transsexual.304 It is punishment because it denies them the privileges—such as, socializing with others and outdoors activities—that
the general population enjoys.305 It begs the question of why the perpetrators of violent assaults are not segregated instead, in order to
protect the vulnerable inmates. If the violent inmates are segregated
from society because they could not properly function in it, they
should also be removed from the general prison population for violating its integrity and security as well. The most likely answer is that it
is easier this way because there are far fewer victims than predators.306
As with medical care,307 an official’s constitutional duty to provide
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security to all inmates may override a single inmate’s constitutional
rights.308
A common sentiment may be that if the inmate did not want to
risk the dangers of prison, then he should not have committed the
crime. However, the dangers of physical and sexual assault are not an
inherent condition of institutional incarceration and are not part of the
state’s sentence for the crime. The sentenced time to be served is the
extent of the state’s lawful punishment.309 The Eighth Amendment’s
role is to ensure that states and the deputies charged with carrying out
the sentences uphold that ideal. If these risks were factored in, then
the sentences ought to be shortened.
Some suggest that a way to avoid these risks is to house transsexual inmates according to their subjective gender rather than their objective sex.310 However, this does not entirely eliminate the risk,311
and it raises serious questions about privacy rights for the objectively
female inmates.312 No court has decisively ruled on this point.313 But
it is not entirely unheard of for a preoperative transsexual to be housed
according to subjective gender identity rather than physical sex. In
2009, Jasmine Anderson, an objectively-male transsexual, was imprisoned for selling drugs. Though initially housed in a male facility,
she was eventually transferred to a women’s facility in northern
Ohio.314 This is certainly the exception rather than the rule, but it is
encouraging that prison officials are making exceptions for inmates
who need special accommodation.
A more progressive but controversial plan would be to have transsexual-only facilities. Though it may sound impractical, Italy has
established a prison specifically to house transgender inmates.315 It
was not a huge undertaking, housing only thirty transgender inmates
in a former prison for women, and Italy’s most famous transsexual, a
308
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former member of parliament, believed that the prison allowed these
inmates to “serve their time without being persecuted for their sexual
identity.”316 Given the small number of transsexual prisoners, a similar program in the United States would be less financially burdensome
than politically untenable.
Physical security is not only an interest for transsexual inmates,
but a constitutional right.317 It is also in society’s best interest to keep
prisoners safe from violence at the hands of fellow inmates because
“brutalized inmates [are] more likely to commit crimes when released
. . . [because they] suffer severe physical and psychological effects
that hinder their ability to integrate into the community and maintain
stable employment . . . .”318 With difficulty finding stable employment,319 inmates who were brutalized in prison are more likely to become homeless or require government assistance and have higher
rates of recidivism.320
Providing health care along with safe housing may promote rehabilitation more than anything else for transsexual inmates.321 Given
that many transsexual inmates were driven to crime to survive or pay
for some form of treatment, providing adequate treatment and protecting them from victimization may help them successfully reintegrate
into society as the desired gender and thereby prevent recidivism.322
If the O’Donnabhain standard influences the way courts treat
transsexual inmates, then new housing protocols must be established
to protect inmates. The Eighth Amendment prohibits conduct by
prison officials that puts inmates at risk of harm. If seeking medical
treatment would put the inmate at risk of some other physical harm,
then the Eighth Amendment in providing for that medical treatment
316
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must also compel other protections to prevent any harm from other
inmates reacting to that treatment. If this were not true, then the
Eighth Amendment’s protections would become paradoxical or impossible for prison officials to uphold in practice, and would unfairly
force inmates to decide which right is most important to them. Some
compromise must be found that can adequately serve both interests
because transsexual inmates should not be forced to choose between
treating their serious medical need and suffering at the hands of predators.
CONCLUSION
Transsexualism has been recognized as a serious medical need.323
Accordingly, under Estelle v. Gamble, prisoners diagnosed as transsexual have a constitutionally protected right to adequate medical care
under the Eighth Amendment.324 The American public has recognized that transgender and transsexual individuals are a social and
sexual minority deserving increased legal and institutional protections.
It is only right, constitutionally and morally, that these greater protections granted by federal and state governments extend to transsexuals
in the carceral care of those governments. After all, inmates are constitutionally entitled to state-provided health care, whereas the population at large is not.
For many years, proposals regarding adequate care for transsexuals have been debated by advocacy groups and commentators. While
these are valuable efforts, courts are not required to acquiesce to every
demand to change the law.325 Hopefully, the opinion of a forwardthinking administrative tax court, when coupled with strong demonstrations of evolving social expectations, will carry more weight in the
analysis of what treatment transsexual inmates are entitled to. The
O’Donnabhain court decided that if there is a legitimate and serious
medical need, and the treatment bears “a direct or proximate therapeutic relation” to that need, a transgender individual is entitled to the tax
benefit for medical expenses.326 Translated to the Eighth Amendment
323
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context, it should mean that the level of care that properly diagnosed
transsexual inmates receive is adequate for the severity of their GID.
Inmates who feel that they have an incongruity between their gender
and sex are, at the very least, entitled to medical examination to determine whether they are in fact transsexual. If sound medical judgment indicates a transsexual diagnosis, then care is required. If the
medical judgment determines that the inmate only requires psychotherapy, then that is all that the inmate is entitled to. But, if another
inmate requires more, the care provided should not be limited by nonmedical concerns or the fact that another inmate required less intensive care. Consequently, if a prison official relies on sound medical
judgment, then the complaining inmate does not have an Eighth
Amendment claim.327 If sex-altering treatment is provided, appropriate steps must be taken to protect the inmate from predation.
Our social and cultural predilection for a gender binary system
and shunning of criminals should not lead us to deny transsexual inmates proper treatment. Indeed they are criminals, but the sentence
the justice system imposed was the extent of our moral condemnation
for their actions. Denying them adequate treatment for GID is punishing them not for their crimes, but for their medical condition. Offending cultural norms is not offending society’s laws. Punishing the former certainly constitutes a “cruel and unusual punishment.”328 More
importantly, if we can rehabilitate transgender inmates in both the
medical and social sense, perhaps they will not return to prison.
The relationship between society’s evolving standards of decency
and the Eighth Amendment provisions is always subject to change.
Change has occurred. It is time that constitutional interpretations mirror that evolution. The hope now is to find a court willing to take the
leap.
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